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Preface 
 
This paper was authored by David Blandford of The Pennsylvania State University, 
University Park, PA 16802, USA (dblandford@psu.edu) as part of a project 
commissioned by the International Food & Agricultural Trade Policy Council, and 
funded by the German Marshall Fund and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.  
 
This final version benefited from discussion by task forces established by the 
International Policy Council, as well as by the International Policy Council itself, and 
from comments by members of the IATRC. However, the author takes full responsibility 
for the contents of the paper. Papers reflecting the full input of the task forces and the 
International Policy Council have been published on the International Policy Council’s 
website at agritrade.org, along with the International Policy Council’s advice and 
cautions to negotiators.     3
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The elements of a new agreement relating to domestic support for agriculture are set out 
in the WTO Framework document of July 2004. This introduces the concept of the 
Overall Trade Distorting Support (OTDS), which is to be disciplined and subject to 
reduction. In addition, some of the individual components of the OTDS will be subject to 
minimum required reductions and other elements will be capped. The caps and reduction 
percentages will define each country’s future “entitlement” to Amber and Blue Box 
support. 
 
A base period OTDS will be calculated as the sum of the current bound Total Aggregate 
Measure of Support (TAMS), resulting from the Uruguay Round Agreement, plus an 
allowance for product specific and non-product specific de minimis, plus an additional 
allowance for Blue Box support. The latter three elements will be defined as a percentage 
of the total value of agricultural production in the base period. There will also be caps on 
the product specific AMS. Information from the Framework document and the Harbinson 
modalities are combined with data from notifications to the WTO to examine the 
implications of the overall reductions in the OTDS and its components for a selection of 
countries – Canada, the European Union, Japan, Korea, Norway and the United States. 
 
Detailed analysis reveals that the new approach has the potential to increase significantly 
the constraints on support entitlements for WTO countries. The implications of the new 
rules are complex, and may create new opportunities for strategic behavior on the part of 
individual countries. The likelihood that the approach will actually constrain domestic 
support policies in WTO countries will vary considerably, depending on a country’s 
future composition of support and how this will relate to support entitlement at the end of 
the implementation period. The analysis indicates that significant reduction percentages 
of 60 percent or more in the permitted OTDS and the Total AMS binding will be required 
to create the need for significant reform of existing agricultural policies in many 
countries. In addition, the rules for calculating the AMS may need to be strengthened in 
order to prevent countries from making strategic changes in domestic policies that would 
allow them to avoid effective reductions in that component of support. 
 
Many developed countries have increased the use of Green Box payments in recent years. 
The Framework proposes a tightening of the rules for inclusion. Changes in some income 
support measures will be required as a result of the Cotton Case ruling in the WTO, but 
important issues relate to the eligibility of other support measures and environmental 
payments. A formal WTO review process would seem to be desirable in order to 
                                                 
1 Professor of Agricultural Economics, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, 
USA. (dblandford@psu.edu).    6
determine whether any particular payment actually qualifies for inclusion in the Green 
Box. 
 
Developing countries will face less stringent restrictions and reduction requirements for 
domestic support in a new agreement, and will have a longer period in which to phase in 
reductions in their support entitlements. Whether all developing countries should be 
treated equally in this regard is an important question. Large middle income developing 
countries that wish to increase the support they provide to agriculture will have some 
flexibility to do so under the new rules, and this could create problems for the trading 
system in the future. 
   7
DISCIPLINES ON DOMESTIC SUPPORT IN THE DOHA ROUND 
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the innovative features of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was an attempt to impose 
disciplines on the domestic support provided to agriculture. There was recognition that 
subsidies that stimulate domestic production can lead to reduced imports or increased 
exports. These subsidies, whose levels were subject to restrictions and to negotiated 
reductions, are popularly categorized as “Amber Box” support to distinguish them from 
other forms of support. 
 
The central concept in the definition of Amber Box support is the Aggregate Measure of 
Support (AMS). This was derived from the earlier concept of the Producer Subsidy 
Equivalent (PSE) developed by Josling (FAO 1975), and used by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in its influential study of the 
relationship between domestic agricultural policies and trade distortions (OECD 1987).
2 
The AoA provided for the calculation of a Total AMS (TAMS) for a base period (1986-
88) to include three elements: market price support, non-exempt direct payments and 
other subsidies that were not exempt from reduction commitments. Countries agreed to 
reduce the base period TAMS by 20 percent to a final bound level by the year 2000 (2004 
for developing countries), and to maintain their actual TAMS below the bound level in 
subsequent years. The final bound TAMS applying to each of the relevant WTO member 
countries is shown in Table 1. Policies that were judged to have no or minimally 
distorting effects on trade or production were exempt from reductions (so-called Green 
Box payments) as were payments under production-limiting programs (so-called Blue 
Box payments). 
 
An important feature of the method use to evaluate whether countries are meeting their 
TAMS commitment is the exclusion of certain subsidies from the calculation under the 
de minimis provisions. Under those provisions, trade-distorting domestic support that 
does not exceed 5 percent of a given commodity’s value of production is not counted 
against the TAMS commitment. In addition, support that is not specific to any product 
and amounts to less than 5 percent of the total value of agricultural production is not 
counted against the TAMS commitment. Developing countries were given 10 percent 
exemptions under both de minimis provisions.
3 
 
                                                 
2 The key difference between the AMS and the PSE (now renamed the Producer Support Estimate) is that 
annual calculations of the former are made using a fixed set of world reference prices for the period 1986-
88. The PSE uses world prices prevailing in the actual year the calculation is made. 
3 In China’s accession agreement to the WTO in 2001, its de minimis exemption was set at 8.5 percent of 
the relevant production value.    8
Table 1 – Final Bound Total AMS under the Uruguay Round Agreement  
Member  Final Implementation Year Currency  Final Bound AMS 
Argentina  2004  In $ of 1992  75,021,292.4 
Australia  2000  $A million  471.9 
Brazil  2004  US$'000  912,105.2 
Bulgaria  2001  ECU million  520.0 
Canada  2000  Can$ million  4,301.0 
Colombia  2004  US$'000  344,733.0 
Costa Rica  2004  US$'000  15,945.0 
Croatia  2004  €  134,116,772.0 
Cyprus  2004  £C million  50.6 
Czech Republic  2000  Kč million  13,611.3 
EC (15)  2000  € million  67,159.0 
FYR Macedonia  2003  € million  16.3 
Hungary  2000  Ft million  33,808.0 
Iceland  2000  SDR million  130.1 
Israel  2004  US$'000  568,980.0 
Japan  2000  ¥ billion  3,972.9 
Jordan  2006  JD  1,333,973.0 
Korea, Republic of  2004  W billion  1,490.0 
Lithuania  2005  US$ million  94.6 
Mexico  2004  Mex$ 1991 million 25,161.2 
Moldova  2004  SDR million  12.8 
Morocco  2004  DH million  685.0 
New Zealand  2000  $NZ million  288.3 
Norway  2000  Nkr million  11,449.0 
Papua New Guinea  2004  US$ million  34.2 
Poland  2000  US$ million  3,329.0 
Slovak Republic  2000  Sk million  10,140.0 
Slovenia  2000  ECU '000  61,845.7 
South Africa  2000  R million  2,015.4 
Switzerland - Liechtenstein  2000  Sw F million  4,257.0 
Chinese Taipei  2000  NT$ million  14,165.2 
Thailand  2004  B million  19,028.5 
Tunisia  2004  D million  59.3 
United States of America  2000  US$ million  19,103.3 
Venezuela  2004  US$'000  1,130,667.0 
 
Source:  WTO. Total Aggregate Measurement of Support. TN/AG/S/13. January 27, 2005.   9
THE STARTING POINT FOR REDUCTIONS IN DOMESTIC SUPPORT 
The Doha Ministerial Declaration calls for “substantial reductions in trade distorting 
domestic support” (WTO 2001). The Framework document (WTO 2004) – herein after 
referred to as the “Framework” – specifies the following: 
1.  A substantial reduction in the overall level of trade-distorting support (defined as 
the bound TAMS, plus permitted de minimis, plus Blue Box support) from base 
period levels in developed countries with a strong element of harmonization, in 
which higher levels of permitted trade-distorting support will be subject to deeper 
cuts.  
2.  In addition to the overall reduction commitment, a substantial reduction in the 
bound TAMS and permitted de minimis levels; the capping of Blue Box support 
at  5 percent of the average value of total agricultural production for an historical 
period; and the capping of product-specific AMS at their respective average levels 
according to a methodology to be agreed. 
3.  Special and differential treatment (S&D) for developing countries to include 
longer implementation periods and lower reduction coefficients for all types of 
trade-distorting domestic support, plus continued access to the provisions under 
Article 6.2 of the AoA (exemption for direct or indirect assistance for agriculture 
and rural development). The Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) are not required 
to make any reduction commitments. 
 
In the context of domestic support, the Framework contains provisions relating to the 
following elements: 
1.  The overall reduction in the OTDS 
2.  The final bound TAMS 
3.  Product specific AMS 
4.  De Minimis support 
5.  Blue Box support 
6.  Green Box support 
7.  Special and differential treatment for developing countries (S&D). 
 
The analysis in this paper relies primarily on the Framework, but also draws on selected 
elements from the First Draft of Modalities (WTO 2003). Those modalities are generally 
associated with the name of the then-chairman of the WTO Committee on Agriculture, 
Stuart Harbinson, and I shall refer to them as the Harbinson Modalities. 
 
CLARIFICATION OF SOME BASIC ISSUES 
At the outset, it is essential to clarify the basic approach used for WTO disciplines on 
domestic support. The final bound TAMS represents a commitment on the maximum 
amount of support that a country can provide through the Amber Box, calculated using 
conventions established in the AoA . The actual Amber Box support measured using 
those conventions can be larger than that under the bound TAMS due to the de minimis 
provisions. The final bound TAMS plus the de minimis allowances can be interpreted as 
support entitlements. Countries are entitled to provide up to that amount of support, as   10
measured under AoA conventions, but the amount of support that they actually provide, 
again measured on the basis of those conventions, can be less.
4 
 
The amount of support that is counted against the TAMS entitlement is determined by 
computing the current AMS for each commodity, using the rules set out in the AoA. If 
the AMS is more than 5 percent of the value of the production for that commodity, it is 
included in the current TAMS. If it is not, it is excluded by virtue of the commodity 
specific de minimis. In addition, a calculation is made of the non-commodity specific 
AMS. If that is greater than 5 percent of the total value of production it is included in the 
current TAMS. If it is less than 5 percent of the total value of agricultural production, it is 
excluded under the non-commodity specific de minimis provision.  
 
It is important to note that the amount of support for an individual commodity that is 
calculated under the provisions of the AoA in a given year may differ from the actual 
amount of support provided for that commodity. One of the principal reasons for this is 
that fixed external reference prices (world prices) for the period 1986-88 are used to 
calculate market price support for commodities for which domestic/international price 
comparisons can be made. Because the base period reference prices may not correspond 
to actual world prices in the current year, the calculated level of support for the AMS can 
differ from the actual level of support provided. 
 
In discussing options under the current round of negotiations, it is important to 
distinguish between bindings or commitments on the various elements of support (i.e., 
maximum permitted values) which define allowable amounts of support (entitlements) 
and the actual support provided. The impact of potential reductions in the OTDS 
entitlement cannot be determined without considering how the components of the OTDS 
will be treated and how that treatment relates to an individual country’s actual use of its 
components. In terms of the OTDS entitlement, key factors are: the percentage reduction 
in the bound TAMS; limitations on the AMS for individual commodities; the value of 
production limits placed on support that can be excluded from reductions under the de 
minimis provisions; and limitations on Blue Box support. The impact of the rules 
established for each of these components on individual countries will largely be 
determined by the extent to which countries actually make use of the various elements in 
supporting agriculture. 
 
To examine the issues, WTO data for a selection of countries are used. The primary 
countries covered are: Canada, the European Union, Japan, Korea, Norway, and the 
                                                 
4 The term “entitlement” is not used in official WTO documents. However, it is a convenient short-hand 
term to characterize bound or maximum permitted levels of support under a WTO agreement. The term is 
used in this paper to denote the amount of support (e.g., OTDS, TAMS, AMS, de minimis, or Blue Box) 
that a country would be entitled to provide under an agreement. The calculation of these various elements 
of support will depend on the conventions set out in the AoA and future WTO agreements. It can be 
misleading to compare levels of support derived from national data sources with the entitlements 
established under WTO agreements, due to differences in methodology. In this paper, references to support 
entitlements and the potential use of those assume measurements of support that are based on the rules 
embodied in WTO agreements.   11
United States.
5 These represent a range of member countries of the WTO. Members are 
required to provide data (notifications) relating to the various elements of the AoA, 
including the amount of domestic support they provide in a given year. 
 
BASE PERIOD DATA AND WHAT THEY REVEAL 
It would highly desirable to be able to compare potential changes in domestic support 
resulting from a new WTO agreement with respect to a common base period for all 
countries. Unfortunately, WTO member countries vary in the timeliness of their 
notifications to the WTO. As a result, the base periods that can be used for analysis vary. 
I have chosen to employ an average of the latest three years of data available from the 
WTO notifications. The years involved are: 1998-2000 for Canada and Korea, 1999-2001 
for the European Union, Norway and United States, and 2000-2002 for Japan. For the 
sake of brevity, I shall refer to “the base period” for these data, recognizing the fact that 
the actual years can differ among countries. It should also be noted that some country 
notifications do not contain data on the value of agricultural production – which is key 
information in conducting the analysis. In such cases, figures on the total value of 
production were obtained from the OECD’s PSE/CSE database. 
 
Table 2 contains base data on domestic support and an analysis of some reduction 
formulas for the OTDS and its components.  
 
Table 2. Domestic Support for Selected Countries, Base Data 
     Canada  EU  Japan  Korea  Norway  US 
     1998-00  1999-01  2000-02  1998-00  1999-01  1999-01 
      Million $  Million €  Billion ¥  Bill Won  Mill Kr  Million $ 
Base data            
Bound Total AMS  4,301  67,159  3,973  1,490  11,449  19,103 
Current Total AMS  983  43,607  717  1,602  10,593  16,026 
Product specific de minimis 205  110  15  598  0  102 
Non product specific de minimis 1,009 467  20  448  0  7,171 
Blue Box  0  21,914  90  0  7,558  0 
Green Box  1,788  20,812  2,472  5,342  4,076  50,159 
Production value  29,705  241,159 8,978  31,499 17,430 190,919 
Current OTDS  2,196  66,098  843  2,648  18,151  23,299 
As percent of production value 7%  27%  9%  8%  104%  12% 
Maximum permitted OTDS  8,757 113,188  5,320  9,365 20,750  47,741 
As percent of production value 29%  47%  59%  30%  119%  25% 
The bound Total AMS is the final value under the URA. Other figures relate to actual averages for the 
period indicated (the base period). The current OTDS is current Total AMS + actual de minimus 
(product and non product specific) + actual Blue Box 
Source: Computed from data in country notifications to the WTO. Additional data on production values 
from the OECD PSE/CSE database (2004) 
                                                 
5 As large countries and key players in the negotiations, the inclusion of the EU, Japan and the United 
States is self evident. Canada and Norway provide insights into the potential impact of support reductions 
on smaller countries with substantially different levels and compositions of domestic support. Korea is of 
interest because it is likely to be able to take advantage of special and differential treatment accorded to 
developing countries.   12
 
The first row of base data in Table 2 contains the final bound TAMS resulting from the 
Uruguay Round Agreement. The second row is the current average TAMS reported to the 
WTO for the base period. It excludes the following two items in the table (the product 
specific and non product specific de minimis). 
 
The first point to observe is the substantial variation among the countries in the degree to 
which they used their TAMS entitlement (Figure 1). Korea reported that its current 
TAMS exceeded its bound TAMS by an average of 8 percent for 1998-2000. Norway and 
the United States were within 10 percent and 20 percent, respectively of their bound 
levels. The European Union had a 35 percent margin of difference. Canada and Japan 
were both substantially below their bindings. 
 

















Note: data relate to 1998-00 for Canada and Korea, 1999-01 for the EU, Norway and the United States, and 
2000-02 for Japan. 
 
The second point to note is the substantial variability in the relative importance of the de 
minimis exclusions among countries. Norway and Canada represent two extremes in this 
regard. Norway reported no de minimis exemptions in the base period. In contrast, 
Canada’s total de minimis (product and non product specific) was larger that the current 
base period TAMS. Among the large countries in the WTO, the de minimis exemptions 
were particularly significant for the United States, being equivalent in size to 45 percent 
of the current TAMS. The de minimis is also significant for Korea, which benefits from 
the 10 percent exemption rule for developing countries; Korea’s de minimis exemptions 
were equivalent in size to 65 percent of its current TAMS. It should also be noted that for 
two of the countries for which the de minimis exemptions are important (Canada and the   13
United States), the non product specific exemption is the more significant. In Korea the 
non product specific exemption is larger, but both exemptions are significant. 
 
The Blue Box category of support was of major importance for the European Union and 
Norway in the base period. The magnitude of Blue Box support in the EU was half the 
size of its current TAMS. In Norway it was equivalent in size to 70 percent of the current 
TAMS. Recent changes in policy will affect the future size of Blue Box support in both 
the European Union and the United States. This complicates the interpretation of any 
analysis based on historical data. The issues are discussed in greater detail in the section 
below that deals with the Blue Box. 
 
The final category of support – the Green Box – is extremely important for several of the 
countries included in Table 2. The value of support under this category is more than three 
times as large at the current TAMS in Japan, Korea and the United States.
6 It is relatively 
less significant in comparison to the current TAMS in Canada, the European Union and 
Norway, although total Green Box payments exceeded the current TAMS by more than 
50 percent in Canada. 
 
































Note: data relate to 1998-00 for Canada and Korea, 1999-01 for the EU, Norway and the United States, and 
2000-02 for Japan. National currency values converted to U.S. dollars at the average exchange rate 
applicable to the base period for each country. 
 
                                                 
6 The figure for Korea includes expenditures under development programs that are exempt under special 
and differential treatment. These were roughly 1 percent of the total of Green plus S&D exempt.   14
Figures 2 and 3 summarize the overall situation in the base period with respect to the 
levels of domestic support and its composition for the countries in Table 2. Both graphs 
depict the three components of support: 1. total Amber Box (defined as the current 
TAMS plus de minimis); 2. Blue Box; and 3. Green Box. Figure 2 shows the components 
of support for each country expressed in U.S. dollars, using exchange rates corresponding 
to the respective base periods for each country. The European Union has the highest total 
support, with the United States and Japan in the next two positions. The United States has 
the second place position by virtue of a large amount of Green Box support. Figure 3 
provides a clearer picture of the differing composition of support among the countries. It 
illustrates the importance of Green Box support in Japan, Korea and the United States, 
and the importance of the Blue Box in the European Union and Norway. 
 
































Note: data relate to 1998-00 for Canada and Korea, 1999-01 for the EU, Norway and the United States, and 
2000-02 for Japan. 
 
As noted earlier, an important innovation in the Doha Round proposals is a widening of 
the support that is to be disciplined, beyond that counted in the TAMS. The concept of 
the Overall Trade Distorting Support (OTDS) – the sum of the bound TAMS, permitted 
de minimis and capped Blue Box support, is the embodiment of this broader coverage. 
Under a new agreement countries will undertake commitments on the maximum OTDS, 
as well as its components. The fulfillment of those commitments will be monitored on the 
basis of the evolution of the actual OTDS. As a starting point for the comparison of 
future options for reductions, the current OTDS (actual TAMS plus de minimis plus Blue 
Box payments) in the base period for each of the countries is given in the base data 
section of Table 2. 
   15
The size of the current OTDS in the base period relative to the value of production varies 
considerably among the countries. The most startling case is Norway, for which the 
current OTDS exceeds the value of production in the base period.  This is due to the 
relatively large amount of both Amber and Blue Box support provided to Norwegian 
agriculture (as depicted in Table 2 and Figure 3). With the exception of the European 
Union, for which the OTDS was 27 percent of the value of production in the base period, 
























Note: data relate to 1998-00 for Canada and Korea, 1999-01 for the EU, Norway and the United States, and 
2000-02 for Japan. 
 
What is potentially significant for a future WTO agreement is the extent to which 
limitations on the OTDS has the potential to exert greater discipline on the actual support 
provided by individual countries. Some insight into this can be obtained by comparing 
the ratio of the current support subject to WTO disciplines (as reflected by the current 
TAMS) to the current OTDS (Figure 4). Other things being equal, the smaller the 
percentage in the graph the higher the potential for greater discipline on support through 
the use of OTDS reductions. Whether that potential actually applies in practice will 
depend on the nature of the disciplines imposed by a new agreement (specifically the 
reduction percentages for the OTDS and its components) and whether these are actually 
binding. In Canada’s case, a key issue is whether reduced caps on de minimis will have a 
                                                 
7 Since the value of production includes all commodities, whether or not these receive government support, 
a country which provides support to most of its agricultural commodities, such as Norway, is likely to have 
a higher OTDS ratio than countries for which parts of their agricultural sectors receive relatively little 
support, such as the United States. This partly explains some of the differences in the percentages. The 
other key factor is the level of the support for supported commodities.   16
significant impact. The same is true for Korea and the United States, since the difference 
between the current OTDS and the current TAMS is attributable to de minimis 
exclusions. For the European Union and Norway, a major factor is the inclusion of Blue 
Box support in the OTDS. The likely shift of some of the support provided by the United 
States to the Blue Box under current agricultural legislation means that the future of that 
component of support will also be of importance of the United States. 
 
THE KEY FACTORS IN THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT 
Key factors with respect to reductions in domestic support in the Framework are: 
1.  The application of separate and complementary reduction formulas for the OTDS, 
TAMS, and de minimis, but not for Blue Box payments. 
2.  A commitment that the reduction of the OTDS will not to be applied as a ceiling, 
should the separate formulas for reductions in the TAMS and de minimis apply a 
greater total cut in the OTDS. 
One implication of these factors it that options for countries to behave strategically in 
responding to reductions in the OTDS (in particular, to reduce the impact of reductions 
on Blue Box payments) may be limited, depending on the nature of the individual 
reduction requirements for the components of the OTDS. 
 
OVERALL TRADE-DISTORTING DOMESTIC SUPPORT  
It should be recalled that Overall Trade Distorting Support (OTDS) is defined as the final 
bound TAMS, plus permitted de minimis, plus capped Blue Box. In the Framework, the 
capped Blue Box value was defined as 5 percent of the value of domestic production. 
However, there is a special provision for countries whose Blue Box payments are 
particularly large, the importance of which will be illustrated subsequently. It should also 
be noted that the Framework refers to “permitted de minimis levels” in reference to 
reductions in individual components (paragraph 6) but a “permitted de minimis level” in 
respect of the use of a tiered formula for reductions (paragraph 7). While this introduces 
some apparent ambiguity, it seems reasonable to assume that the OTDS will include 
separate elements for both product specific and non product specific de minimis. This 
assumption is employed in subsequent calculations in the paper. 
 
The Framework agreement indicates that “Members having higher levels of trade-
distorting domestic support will make greater overall reductions in order to achieve a 
harmonizing result”. This implies the use of a tiered approach to the reduction 
percentage; it appears to imply that the tiers will be based on the absolute level of 
support in a base period.  
 
In order to establish the tiers it is necessary to compare the OTDS entitlement across 
countries. To do so, requires the use of a common currency (e.g., Euros or U.S. dollars). 
The choice of currency may not be a simple issue from a political perspective, not only 
because of the sensitivity that might be associated with according a particular currency 
the status of a global numeraire, but also because of the implications of changes in 
exchange rates among the currencies of certain WTO members. It is not possible to 
conduct a simple analysis of the effects of currency variations and the choice of a base   17
period for the OTDS entitlement because available data in the country notifications are 
relatively dated and (as noted earlier) it is difficult to make comparisons for a uniform 
base period. Nevertheless, the basic issue can be illustrated by comparing changes in the 
final bound TAMS expressed in U.S. dollars for recent years. Figure 5 presents such a 
comparison using currency values for 2000 and 2004. Comparing these years, the value 
of the final bound TAMS for the European Union has risen by 36 percent, while that for 
Japan has barely changed (Figure 5a). In dollar terms, the final bound TAMS in the 
Union was more that four times as large as that in the United States using the value of the 
dollar in 2004, compared to roughly three times as large using the value of the dollar in 
2000.
8 The bound TAMS of many other countries that have a lower absolute bound 
TAMS has also increased (Figure 5b).  
 



































Based on the overall size of the bound TAMS in the European Union, the relative 
magnitude of the difference between the next largest bound TAMS (that of Japan) as 
shown in Figure 5a, it might be argued that the European Union should be in a class of its 
own when tiers for reductions in support are determined.
9 However, if one compares the 
bound TAMS of each country to the average value of production, one might come to a 
different conclusion (Figure 6). Some smaller countries, such as Norway and 
Switzerland, have a high bound TAMS relative to the value of their domestic agricultural 
production. It is noteworthy that under this comparison, of the larger countries depicted 
                                                 
8 A comparison based on Euro would yield a decline in the value of the TAMS in Japan and the United 
States. The qualitative conclusion of a widening gap between the TAMS of these countries and that of the 
European Union would still hold. 
9 This is the assumption made by Brink (2005). Presumably a final determination on the countries to be 
included in the tiers would be based on the OTDS rather than the TAMS, on the assumption that the 
relevant data were made available by the Member countries to the WTO.   18
in Figure 5a, Japan has a high relative entitlement to support. The European Union ranks 
second; the United States ranks behind Canada.  
 




















































Note: data relate to 1998-00 for Canada and Korea, 1999-01 for the EU, Norway and the United States, and 
2000-02 for Japan. 
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If one accepts the logic of an approach to future reductions in support that is linked to the 
absolute level of support, countries will a larger total OTDS entitlement in the base 
period would be subject to a larger total reduction. To the extent that a larger total value 
of support equates with a larger absolute effect of that support on the volume of trade, 
this would place the emphasis on achieving the greatest reductions in the entitlements to 
support for countries that ceteris paribus would account for the largest distortions in 
world trade. One characteristic of such an approach is that small developed countries that 
do not contribute significantly to the absolute level of distortion in world trade, but have 
an entitlement to provide a large amount of trade-distorting support relative to the value 
of their domestic production (e.g., Norway and Switzerland), may be less affected, since 
they would presumably be in a lower tier.
10 As we shall see, with respect to Norway, this 
would not necessarily mean that such countries would be less affected, in practice, given 
the approach being considered for reducing the domestic support entitlement in the 
negotiations. 
 
Brink (2005) provides an analysis of a tiered reduction in the bound TAMS and OTDS 
entitlement based on an absolute approach. Using information similar to that in Figure 5, 
he suggests that the European Union would be in the highest tier (tier 1); Japan and the 
United States would be in a second tier (tier 2); and remaining countries would be in 
subsequent tiers. He notes that the actual number of tiers would need to be decided in the 
negotiations. Brink suggests that one option would be for other developed countries to be 
in a third tier, with developing countries in a final tier, in line with the principle of special 
and differential treatment for such countries. Even though in absolute terms (measured in 
any currency) the EU’s OTDS entitlement is substantially larger than in any other 
country, as noted earlier, it might prove politically difficult to place the European Union 
in a tier of its own. 
 
THE FINAL BOUND TOTAL AMS 
The Framework specifies the use of a tiered formula with greater reductions for larger 
values of the bound TAMS in order to achieve a harmonizing effect. Greater than 
formula reductions are possible in order to achieve a given overall reduction in trade 
distorting support (i.e., to permit smaller cuts in Blue Box, since this is not subject to an 
explicit reduction formula – see below). The Framework also indicates that Members that 
have a higher bound TAMS will make larger reductions in the bound TAMS. The 
Harbinson Modalities included a specification for a 60 percent reduction in the final 
bound TAMS in equal annual installments over a period of five years with 40 percent for 
developing countries over 10 years. It also indicated that TAMS commitments could be 
made in national currency, a foreign currency, or a basket of currencies.
11 
 
                                                 
10 A mixed approach (with absolute and relative support criteria) could be adopted in which countries 
whose current OTDS entitlement exceeds some critical proportion of production, for example, 50 percent 
would be placed in a higher reduction tier. The tiers for the TAMS reduction could also be determined 
using such an approach. 
11 This condition is designed to address the problems that can be faced by countries whose currencies are 
unstable. It opens up the possibility for strategic behavior based on expectations of future currency 
movements, but this issue is not analyzed in the paper.   20
An important issue is whether the reduction percentage for the bound TAMS will differ 
from that for the OTDS. If the TAMS percentage is larger than that for the OTDS 
entitlement, this would reduce the adjustment that would have to be made in other 
components of the OTDS entitlement, particularly Blue Box support, in order to meet the 
OTDS commitment. It could mean that the reduction percentage in the OTDS would not 
be binding, i.e., that the reduction in the bound TAMS and de minimis would exceed the 
required reduction in the OTDS.
12  Conversely, if the reduction percentage for the bound 
TAMS were set lower than that for the OTDS, the OTDS reduction would probably be 
binding, and this could force a country to reduce its actual TAMS below the bound level 
in order to meet the OTDS reduction commitment. The implications of separate reduction 
percentages for the various components of the OTDS and for the OTDS as a whole are 
relatively complex for future entitlements to support. Their actual impact is further 
complicated by how these entitlements relate to the actual level of support provided 




The Framework specifies that the product-specific AMS will be capped at average levels 
to be agreed, with “reductions of some product-specific support”. It is not clear if this 
relates to the aggregate of such support or that for each individual product category. The 
latter would seem to be more likely since the Harbinson Modalities specified that the 
current AMS for individual products would not exceed average levels for 1999-2001. It 
also appears to be likely that the cap would be expressed in absolute terms, rather than as 
a percentage, in line with the approach used for establishing the TAMS binding.
13 
 
A key argument for the capping of the product-specific AMS is that it prevents an 
escalation of support for individual commodities. Countries whose current TAMS is 
substantially less than the bound level (Figure 1) have substantial flexibility to increase 
the amber box support for individual commodities. 
 
Some of the issues associated with the use of product-specific caps are illustrated by data 
for the United States in Table 3. This contains the average AMS for some of the most 
important supported commodities in the United States for the most recent three years 
notified to the WTO (1999-2001). The three-year average AMS as a percentage of 
production is also given, as is the highest percentage for the three years. The first point to 
                                                 
12 The actual outcome would depend on the relative reduction percentages for the OTDS entitlement and 
the bound TAMS, and the relative size of the current TAMS and de minimis. A key factor is the proposed 
fixed reduction in the de minimis exemptions of 50 percent. 
13 Note that the proposed cap on Blue Box payments is an absolute cap, but one whose initial value is to be 
determined on the basis of a percentage of the value of production in the base period (see the section on the 
Blue Box below). In implementing caps for the product specific AMS it would be possible to use a similar 
approach to the product specific de minimis, i.e., to evaluate the annual product specific AMS in terms of a 
capped percentage of the value of production for that commodity. This would provide more flexibility for 
countries to meet their commitments when the value of production is varies from year to year. As argued 
subsequently, such variability may make it difficult for countries to meet these commitments, if they are 
based on historical averages of actual AMS levels.   21
note is the substantial variation in the average value of the AMS across commodities. For 
the commodities listed, the range is from 12 percent of the value of production for corn 
(maize) and wheat to 57 percent for rice.
14 The average AMS for all supported 
commodities was 14 percent of the value of their production. The second point to note is 
that there is substantial year-to-year variability in the relative amount of support provided 
to some commodities. For example, even though the average AMS for cotton was 
equivalent to 47 percent of the value of production for the three years, it was as high as 
74 percent in one of those years. Similarly, while the average AMS for rice was 57 
percent over this three year period, in one year it was 82 percent. The variation in the 
relative level of support (and whether a product is counted in the TAMS or in product 
specific de minimis) can be due to changes in the amount of support provided and/or in 
the value of production. 
 
Table 3. Bindings on the Product Specific AMS and Changes in de Minimis for the 









Corn 2,193  12%  15% 
Cotton 2,071  47%  74% 
Dairy 4,738  21%  24% 
Peanuts 364  38%  49% 
Rice 607  57%  82% 
Soybeans 3,358  27%  29% 
Sugar 1,149  55%  57% 
Tobacco 481  24%  39% 
Wheat 670  12%  17% 
      
 
Average non-product 
specific AMS  7,171  4%   
 
Average AMS on supported 
products   14%   
 
Average AMS 5% de 
minimis 16,026     
 
Average AMS 2.5% de 
minimis 23,273     
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Only selected commodities are shown. AMS percentages are with respect to the value of production 
 
On the basis of the year-to-year variability in the product specific AMS revealed by these 
figures, one might conclude that the United States might have great difficulty in 
complying with a cap on each product specific AMS. It should be noted that the period 
1999-2001 was one of considerable policy instability in the United States. During those 
                                                 
14 As noted subsequently in the discussion of product specific de minimis, wheat actually qualified for a de 
minimis exclusion in one year of the base period.   22
years the U.S. Congress was actively involved in providing various forms of emergency 
or special assistance to farmers. The year 2000 was one in which actual expenditures on 
various forms of agricultural support reached an all-time record of over $32 billion.
15  
The variation illustrated by the U.S. figures for this period may be atypical. However, it 
is possible that even during periods of greater stability in agricultural policies, the United 
States and other countries would have difficulty in living with the limitations on policy 
flexibility imposed by rigid product-specific caps on the AMS 
 
It is worth noting that the use of fixed reference prices for the calculation of market price 
support has interesting implications for “large” countries – those whose production 
volumes can be expected to influence world prices, particularly when their production is 
subject to random fluctuations due to weather conditions. The use of a fixed reference 
price is likely to overstate the actual amount of support in such countries if poor weather 
causes their domestic production to fall and world prices to rise; and to understate support 
if good weather causes production to rise and world prices to fall. Since market price 
support is calculated as the difference between a domestic support price and a world 
reference price multiplied the volume of production eligible for support, all countries, 
both large and small, could find that they breach a product specific AMS cap without any 
change in the per unit support provided, simply because domestic production is higher 
than normal. This may add to the difficulty that countries may face in meeting their 
commitments with commodity specific AMS caps. 
 
In implementing product specific AMS caps, the choice of the base period could be 
important. For example, as indicated above, a period that included the high support year 
of 2000 would be advantageous for the United States. In fact, it could be argued that 
since the cap would be linked to actual levels of support, those countries that had 
refrained from providing support and consequently had a low product-specific AMS 
would be penalized, while countries with high product-specific AMS would be 
rewarded.
16 To some extent AMS caps build in an entitlement on the basis of previous 
“bad behavior”. In order to address this issue a formula reduction requirement could be 
specified for each product specific AMS. This would probably have to be similar in 
magnitude to the reduction percentages associated with the OTDS or the TAMS. The use 
of such an approach would have the advantage of ensuring that trade distorting support 
was reduced proportionately across the range of supported commodities. 
 
A key feature of the use of product-specific caps and a product-specific reduction 
formula would be to limit the ability of countries to reallocate their AMS to protect more 
sensitive sectors, although it would not prevent this (countries could still reallocate actual 
support to maintain the capped value on sensitive products, even if they could not exceed 
the cap). As we have seen with the AMS itself in recent years, fixing maximum values 
                                                 
15 The figure cited refers to net outlays by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), which is a federally 
owned and operated corporation within the U.S. Department of Agriculture created to stabilize and support 
agricultural prices and farm income by making loans and payments to producers, purchasing commodities, 
and by various other operations. The CCC handles all money transactions for agricultural price and income 
support and related programs. Note that changes in the expenditures incurred by the CCC do not 
necessarily translate into changes in the AMS for individual commodities. 
16 This criticism might also be leveled at the original TAMS entitlements under the Uruguay Round.   23
for support can create an entitlement mentality among agricultural producers who then 
pressure policymakers to provide the full amount of their “entitlement” of the specified 
level of support. This was the experience with the 2002 Farm Bill in the United States. 
The use of caps, therefore, may actually impede the process of policy reform. For 
example, there might be little incentive for U.S. dairy or sugar producers to give up 
current forms of support that are included under the capped AMS entitlements, even if 
less-distorting policies were on offer as part of a new Farm Bill. 
 
It could certainly be argued that the creation of tighter discipline on the amount of 
support that can be provided for individual commodities would be desirable, particularly 
from the perspective of producers of those commodities in other countries who are trying 
to compete with subsidized production. A major advantage of product specific caps is 
that they prevent the escalation of subsidies for individual commodities. However, as 
noted above it might be difficult for policymakers to stay within these caps due to year-
to-year fluctuations. The establishment of a discipline which policymakers might be 
unable to satisfy might not make a positive contribution to the WTO process, unless one 
were to judge the value of that process in terms of the volume of litigation. For this 
reason, an alternative might be to focus on aggressive reduction percentages for the 
OTDS entitlement and tightening the rules for the calculation of support to force a 
reorientation of policies in countries that provide significant support to agriculture. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the requirement for reductions in “some product specific 
support” as specified in the Framework would seem to be virtually inevitable providing 
that sufficiently high reduction percentages are specified for the OTDS entitlement and 
the bound TAMS. This is particularly so for countries whose current TAMS is relatively 
close to the current bound level. In the reduction formula examples presented 
subsequently, the likelihood that broad reductions in actual support would be necessary is 
evaluated, using percentages that have been mentioned previously in the negotiations. For 
countries that are concerned about imposing greater discipline on domestic support, the 
major priority might be to achieve “aggressive” reduction percentages in the OTDS 
entitlement and its components that would actually be binding on the amount of support 
that countries actually provide. An indication of the magnitude of such reduction 
percentages is given subsequently in the paper. 
 
DE MINIMIS  
The Harbinson Modalities proposed that the 5 percent de minimis exemptions for 
developed countries be reduced to 2.5 percent in equal installments over a period of five 
years. The 10 percent de minimis for developing countries would to be maintained, with 
credit for negative product-specific support up to a maximum of 10 percent of the value 
of production for that commodity. The Framework simply calls for negotiated reductions 
to take into account S&D; and an exemption for those developing countries that allocate 
almost all de minimis support to subsistence and resource-poor farmers. It notes that 
greater than formula reductions should be possible to meet overall reduction requirement 
for trade-distorting support. Of the countries analyzed in this paper, only Korea qualified 
for developing country status under the AoA. In the empirical analysis conducted   24
subsequently in this paper it is assumed that this will continue to apply, but that the de 
minimis for non-exempt developing countries will be reduced to 5 percent. 
 
As noted earlier, there are two components to the de minimis – a product specific 
component and a non product specific component. The importance of these varies among 
countries, as illustrated by the data in Table 2. For most countries, a reduction in the de 
minimis cap is likely to be potentially more significant for non product specific support. 
Korea is the only country in Table 2 for which the actual support provided under the 
product specific de minimis provision exceeded that under the provision for non product 
specific support. 
 
It is important to note that under the AoA separate de minimis calculations were applied 
to product and non product specific support. This meant that in the limit a country could 
maintain a support level of just under 10 percent (5 percent for each category of support) 
without such support being counted against its commitments. The OTDS approach seems 
to imply that a cap of 2.5 percent will apply to each de minimis category (with the 
exception of developing countries), meaning that the total level of support under the de 
minimis provision could be maintained at just under 5 percent. The use of a 5 percent cap 
for non-exempt developing countries would imply that the total level of support under 
this provision could be maintained at just under 10 percent. 
 
Countries have greater flexibility in the use of the non-product specific de minimis than 
the product specific category. Since the non product specific de minimis is an aggregate 
of various forms of support the composition of that support can be varied substantially 
within the capped level. The situation is different for product specific de minimis, since as 
in the U.S. example discussed above with respect to a product specific AMS, the amount 
of support that can be provided for each commodity is disciplined by the product specific 
cap. For the countries examined in this paper the non product specific de minimis 
exceeded 2.5 percent of the value of production for some commodities in some years (5 
percent for Korea). Unfortunately, the notifications do not permit a complete analysis 
because production values are not provided for 1999 for the EU or 1998 for Korea.
17 
However, it appears that relatively few commodities would be affected by a reduction in 
the de minimis percentage in the base period, and then only in certain years. The 
commodities concerned are summarized in Table 4.  
 
The variability in the level of support in the United States during the base period, which 
was noted earlier in the discussion of caps on the product-specific AMS, is again 
apparent. Commodities move into and out of the de minimis category from year to year 
depending on the level of support and changes in the value of production. 
 
One important implication of the inclusion of a product specific de minimis in the OTDS 
entitlement is an issue of “double counting” (Roberts 2005). This relates to the fact that 
the de minimis allowance in the base OTDS refers to 5 percent of the total value of 
production, rather than to the value of production for those commodities for which a 
                                                 
17 The 1999 production values were not given in the original notification, but were subsequently provided 
to the Committee on Agriculture at its meeting of 28-29 June 2001 (see the summary record G/AG/R/27).   25
product specific de minimis exemption is claimed in the base period. While the eligibility 
of each particular commodity for the exemption is evaluated on a year-to-year basis with 
respect to its value of production in that year, and this imposes some discipline on its use, 
the use of the 5 percent figure provides some extra “padding” in the base period OTDS.
18 
  
Table 4. Products Affected by a Reduction in the Product Specific de Minimis 
during the Base Period  
Country Product 
Canada Barley  (de minimis in 1998 and 2000, counted in the TAMS in 
1999) 
Wheat and durum, and Dry Beans above 2.5 percent in 2000 
 Oats  (de minimis in 1997 only, counted in the TAMS for the two 
remaining years)  
Korea    Garlic, Maize, Other Cereals and Silkworm (AMS was 5 percent or 
more of the value of production in 2000) 
United States  Barley (de minimis in 2001 only) 
 Safflower  (de minimis only in 1999, counted in the TAMS in 2000, 
no support recorded for 2001) 
  Sheep and Lamb (de minimis in 1999 and 2000, counted in the 
TAMS in 2001) 
  Wheat (counted in the TAMS in 1999 and 2000, de minimis in 
2001).   
 
While the reduction in the maximum de minimis from 5 percent of the value of 
production to 2.5 percent imposes a greater constraint on its use than under the AoA, the 
inclusion of two separate allowances for each category means that these are a significant 
proportion of the base period OTDS entitlement (twice the value of the blue box for 
countries that are allowed the standard 5 percent blue box cap). Countries that do not use 
their de minimis exemptions may still benefit from their inclusion, since this may dilute 
the effective reduction required in other elements of the OTDS for any given reduction in 
the overall OTDS entitlement. Conversely, an aggressive reduction an aggressive 
reduction percentage for the OTDS could force additional reductions in actual de minimis 
support, regardless of the nominal entitlement.  
 
BLUE BOX 
The Framework calls for the capping of Blue Box support at 5 percent of the average 
value of total agricultural production for an historical period. However, it does not 
                                                 
18 It should be noted that this is only the case if the TAMS is non-zero. In the limit, if the TAMS were 
reduced to zero, all product specific support would be de minimis, the support for each product would not 
exceed the allowable de minimis percentage, and total support would be less than the permitted percentage 
of the value of total production. It is not clear whether Roberts is suggesting that the aggregate value of 
production used in determining the total product specific de minimis in the OTDS commitment should be 
variable, rather than fixed, but that would mean that the level of the product specific de minimis included in 
the OTDS commitment (or the value of the bound TAMS) would have to change through time in line with 
changes in the composition of products included in the TAMS and the product specific de minimis. Such a 
provision might be difficult to implement.   26
indicate that a specific reduction formula will be used for this category of support.
19  In 
calculating the reduction in the OTDS entitlement, the measurement of the Blue Box 
component will be the higher of existing payments in a representative period or the 
capped value. It is important to note that all countries, whether or not they currently use 
Blue Box payments, will be entitled to include the 5 percent Blue Box cap in their OTDS 
entitlement. This provides some additional padding for countries that do not use Blue 
Box payments. It is unclear whether countries that are forced to change existing policies 
by virtue of reductions in their bound TAMS or the product specific caps on the AMS 
would find it attractive to modify existing programs to qualify for the Blue Box to take 
advantage of the support entitlement under that category, but there is clearly a possibility 
for such strategic behavior.  
 
The Framework extends the definition of Blue Box payments to those made under 
production limiting programs or payments that do not require production (to be 
negotiated). It also specifies that such payments must be made on “fixed and unchanging” 
areas or number of animals. This expansion of the Blue Box definition is intended to 
capture the Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCPs) introduced by the United States as part of 
the 2002 Farm Act.  
 
The payments vary with current market prices, but not with current production.
20 They 
differ from the deficiency payments used by the United States prior to the 1996 Farm Act 
in a key aspect. Those payments, and the EU compensatory payments which are covered 
by the Blue Box, had a production limitation condition attached (e.g., a compulsory set-
aside of part of the area that would otherwise be planted to the supported crop) or were 
made on the basis of a fixed number of animals (in the EU case). The logic was that such 
restrictions could help to offset the potential production enhancing effect of the payment. 
However, it should be noted that even though such payments were associated with a 
production-limitation provision, there is no actual requirement that this should actually be 
imposed, or, if it were, that the restriction should be at such a level that it would offset the 
output-enhancing effect of the payment. Furthermore, a payment linked to a fixed number 
of animals would likely distort trade if there were a requirement to produce in order to 
receive the payment. Consequently, the extent to which such payments are actually 
implemented in such a way as to minimize their impact on trade is unclear.  
 
It is difficult to determine the potential impact of CCPs on production, and how that 
effect compares to the earlier U.S. deficiency payment scheme. Abler and Blandford 
(forthcoming) review a range of empirical studies of the effects of so-called decoupled 
payments under the 1996 U.S. Farm Act and related legislation. Some of those payments, 
the Marketing Loss Assistance (MLA) payments, operated in a similar way to the 
CCPs.
21 The key difference is that the CCPs are explicitly included in continuing 
                                                 
19 This is in contrast to the Draft Modalities which proposed that Blue Box payments be capped at their 
most recent notified level and reduced by 50 percent in equal installments over a period of five years; with 
a 33 percent reduction for developing countries. 
20 They are linked to historical production. The level of payments for an individual producer is unaffected 
by variations in current output, unlike conventional price support programs. 
21 The payments were ostensibly provided to compensate producers for the “loss of markets”, but in reality 
they provided ex post compensation for reductions in prices during the period 1999-2001.   27
legislation (the Farm Act that runs through 2007) whereas the MLAs were legislated on a 
year-to-year basis. One could therefore argue that the availability of CCPs is considered 
to be more certain by producers than were the MLAs and that this might affect their 
response to the payments. Abler and Blandford conclude that empirical evidence provides 
some support for the view that so-called U.S. decoupled payments had some impact on 
production (this is relevant to the Green Box discussion below) even though the 
estimated impacts are modest in comparison to conventional price supports. Nevertheless, 
it is probable that CCPs have some impact on production and trade.
22  
 
One might argue that this is not such an important issue given that the Framework will 
impose some discipline on Blue Box payments for the first time. As noted earlier, Blue 
Box payments are to be included in the OTDS entitlement and, while they are not subject 
to a specific reduction percentage, they are likely to be affected by a reduction 
requirement for the OTDS. In addition, they are subject to the 5 percent cap on the value 
of agricultural production. From a U.S. perspective there is a clear advantage in the 
expansion of the Blue Box definition to include CCPs, since otherwise they would be 
included in the TAMS. Other things being equal, that would impose more immediate and 
explicit discipline on such payments since they would have to be accommodated within 
the TAMS ceiling of $19.1 billion. At 5 percent of the value of production, the separate 
Blue Box provision adds an additional $9.5 billion of support entitlement for the base 
period considered in Table 2. Expenditures on CCPs in 2002-3 averaged around 1 percent 
of the value of total agricultural production in the United States.
23 Again, as is 
demonstrated subsequently, the application of an aggressive OTDS reduction percentage 
could substantially reduce the flexibility open to the United States in using CCPs. 
 
Other countries that use Blue Box payments under the existing AoA provisions are 
affected by the 5 percent limitation in different ways. For Japan, the limitation does not 
seem to be much of an issue if recent policies continue, since in the base period its Blue 
Box payments only amounted to roughly 20 percent of the capped value. EU payments 
were more than 80 percent above the capped value, but the European Union is in the 
process of changing its policies which should result in switching much of the support 
previously provided under the Blue Box to the Green Box category.
24 The greatest 
challenge seems to face Norway. Its Blue Box support was more than eight times the size 
of the 5 percent production cap in the base period. The Framework allows for some 
flexibility in cases where an exceptionally large percentage of trade-distorting support is 
in the Blue Box to avoid “a wholly disproportionate cut”. If this category of support is 
going to continue to be of importance for Norway, it would appear that some relaxation 
of the 5 percent cap would have to be granted to that country.  
 
                                                 
22 The principal argument for the production effect relates to the risk-reducing impact of the payments. 
However, fixed direct payments (which are included in the Green Box) have a wealth effect that may be at 
least as important for production decisions. This could strengthen the argument for moving all income 
support payments to the Blue Box as some commentators have suggested (see below). 
23 Figures obtained from the OECD’s PSE/CSE database. 
24 See the Green Box section of the paper on the current uncertainties created by the recent Cotton case in 
the WTO for future EU and US policies.   28
As noted, the Blue Box is the only element of trade-distorting support for which no 
formula reduction is proposed. Perhaps this is in line with the view that such payments 
are proportionately less distorting than those in the Amber Box. In any event, the Blue 
Box appears to be subject to more degrees of freedom than other components. The fact 
that the required reduction percentage in the Blue Box will be determined by the 
combined effect of reduction percentages in the OTDS and its other elements, introduces 
some uncertainty into the extent to which future Blue Box payments will actually be 
disciplined. A modest reduction in the OTDS entitlement, in particular, would reduce the 
pressure to reduce the Blue Box entitlement below the capped value. In addition, it 
should be noted that countries will have the option of reducing their final bound TAMS 
or the de minimis components beyond the levels implied by the formulas, rather than 
reducing Blue Box payments, in order to meet their formula reduction commitment on 
OTDS (providing that such payments do no exceed the 5 percent value of production 
limitation). It might also be noted that while the overall level of Blue Box support will be 
capped and the bases upon which payments will be made will be fixed, payment rates can 
still be varied to alter the distribution of payments across commodities. Thus if CCPs are 
included under the Blue Box category, this will allow considerable flexibility in ex post 
income stabilization on a product-by-product basis.
25 The issues associated with 
attempting to provide a product-by-product cap on Blue Box payments parallel those 
associated with product-by-product limitations on the AMS discussed earlier.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that criteria for inclusion in the Blue Box have been tightened. 
Payments must now be based on “fixed and unchanging” areas, yields or number of 
animals. This is presumably to stop rebasing (which occurred under the 2002 U.S. Farm 
Act) – rebasing expectations have been identified as a possible reason for rigidity in 
production response (farmers keep more of their area in supported crops in order to 
maintain their future entitlement to payments). The new requirement will introduce some 
rigidity into the distribution of payments (although the payment rates for the various 
commodities could presumably be varied), but if the payments are only a transitional 
measure “in promoting agricultural reforms” (as indicated in the Framework), perhaps we 
should not too be concerned about this.
26 The Framework indicates that “additional 
criteria” will be negotiated (to take account of the balance of WTO rights and obligations, 
and will not have the perverse effect of undoing ongoing reforms), but it is unclear 
exactly what this will involve.
27 One possibility would be to tighten the rules that apply to 
payments that involve production restrictions, to ensure that such restrictions are actually 
binding and of sufficient magnitude to offset the production-enhancing effect. As noted 
above, this is not currently required. 
 
                                                 
25 From the perspective of trade distortions, this is only an issue if the expectation of receiving the 
payments influences production decisions significantly. As indicated above, this is still an open question. 
26 Skeptics might argue that the transitional period might turn out to be of infinite duration. 
27 Some of the possibilities could include capping the support for individual commodities; restrictions on 
the provisions of multiple forms of support linked to prices; and greater transparency in the setting of 
payment rates.   29
IMPLICATIONS OF A FORMULA APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS  
The use of the OTDS as the basis for determining reductions in support has the effect of 
increasing significantly the amount of eligible support in the base period. Figure 7 shows 
the base period OTDS entitlement relative to the Bound TAMS. The inclusion of the de 
minimis and Blue Box allowances means that Korea’s support entitlement in the base 
period increases more than six fold. In the United States, the inclusion of de minimis and 
Blue Box allowances mean that the support entitlement more than doubles. The smallest 
impact of the switch from the TAMS to the OTDS is Japan, but as will be seen from 
subsequent analysis that country is likely to be the least affected by required reductions in 
the OTDS entitlement.  
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Note: data relate to 1998-00 for Canada and Korea, 1999-01 for the EU, Norway and the United States, and 
2000-02 for Japan. 
 
Table 5 contains two examples of the application of a formula approach to the reduction 
in the domestic support entitlement that may help to illustrate some of the issues 
involved.
28 The first example, which is termed an “equal reduction approach”, is intended 
to provide a point of reference for the tiered example. The equal reduction approach 
assumes that each country would be required to reduce its OTDS entitlement and bound 
TAMS by 60 percent. It assumes that the de minimis components would be reduced from 
5 to 2.5 percent of production, with the exception of Korea for which the reduction is 
                                                 
28 I only analyze linear reductions. Other more aggressive approaches are possible conceptually, although 
their acceptance may be less likely politically. Brink (2001) analyzed the application of an aggressive 
harmonization of domestic support based on the Swiss Formula.   30
from 10 to 5 percent. The Blue Box value included in the base OTDS is 5 percent of the 
value of production, except for the European Union and Norway in which it is the actual  
 
Table 5. Domestic Support Reduction Scenarios for Selected Countries 
     Canada  EU  Japan  Korea  Norway  US 
     1998-00  1999-01  2000-02  1998-00  1999-01  1999-01 
      Million $  Million €  Billion ¥  Bill Won  Mill Kr  Million $ 
Equal Reduction  60% 60%  60%  60%  60%  60% 
Maximum OTDS  3,503  45,275 2,128  3,746  8,300 19,096 
Bound  Total  AMS  1,720  26,864  1,589 596 4,580  7,641 
Maximum PS de minimis  743  6,029 224 1,575 436 4,773 
Maximum NPS de minimis  743  6,029 224 1,575 436 4,773 
Maximum permitted Blue Box  1,485  12,058  449  1,575  871  9,546 
Maximum OTDS/production  12%  19%  24%  12%  48%  10% 
Actual maximum Blue Box  1,485  12,058  449  1,575  871  6,580 
Cuts required to meet:            
Maximum OTDS  -1,307 20,823  -1,285 -1,098 9,851 4,202 
Bound Total AMS  -738  16,743  -872  1,006  6,014  8,385 
Required % cut in AMS  0%  38%  0%  63%  57%  52% 
Maximum PS de minimis -538  -5,919  -209  -977  -436  -4,671 
Maximum NPS de minimis  266  -5,562 -204 -1,127 -436 2,398 
Actual maximum Blue Box  -1,485 9,856 -359 -1,575  6,686  -6,580 
            
Tiered Reduction  50% 60%  60%  40%  50%  60% 
Maximum OTDS  4,378  45,275 2,128  5,619 10,375 19,096 
Bound  Total  AMS  2,151  26,864  1,589 894 5,725  7,641 
Maximum PS de minimis  743  6,029 224 1,575 436 4,773 
Maximum NPS de minimis  743  6,029 224 1,575 436 4,773 
Maximum permitted Blue Box  1,485  12,058  449  1,575  871  9,546 
Maximum OTDS/production  15%  19%  24%  18%  60%  10% 
Actual maximum Blue Box  1,485  12,058  449  1,575  871  6,580 
Cuts required to meet:            
Maximum OTDS  -2,182  20,823 -1,285 -2,971  7,776  4,202 
Bound Total AMS  -1,168  16,743  -872  708  4,869  8,385 
Required % cut in AMS  0%  38%  0%  44%  46%  52% 
Maximum PS de minimis -538  -5,919  -209  -977  -436  -4,671 
Maximum NPS de minimis  266  5,562 -204 -1,127 -436 2,398 
Actual maximum Blue Box  -1,485 9,856 -359 -1,575  6,686  -6,580 
            
Assumptions            
Base maximum permitted OTDS  8,757 113,188  5,320  9,365 20,750  47,741 
Value of production  29,705  241,159 8,978  31,499 17,430 190,919 
The equal reduction approach assumes a cut of 60 percent in the maximum OTDS and Bound Total 
AMS and a de minimis of 2.5 percent (5 percent for Korea) for each of the product and non product 
specific components. 
The tiered approach assumes reductions of 60 percent in the maximum OTDS and Bound Total AMS 
for the EU, Japan and the United States; 50 percent for Canada and Norway and 40 percent for Korea, 
with a de minimis of 2.5 percent (5 percent for Korea) for each of the product and non product specific 
components 
Source: Computed from data in country notifications to the WTO. Additional data on production values 
from the OECD PSE/CSE database (2004)   31
 
value of Blue Box payments in the base period. As noted above, the Framework called 
for the OTDS to include the higher of 5 percent of the value of production or actual Blue 
Box payments in the base period for the purposes of calculating reductions. In both the 
European Union and Norway, Blue Box payments exceeded 5 percent of the value of 
production in the base period. 
 
The first block of figures in the table contains the maximum allowable amount for each 
type of support. The second block of figures indicates the cuts required in each 
component from actual base period values. If the required cut is negative, no actual 
reduction would be required.  
 
It should be recalled that Blue Box payments are subject to a cap of 5 percent of the value 
of production, but the maximum allowable payments can be less depending on the net 
effect of the reductions in other components. If the reductions in allowable payments for 
other components are generally binding, then the percentage reduction in the OTDS will 
have a significant impact on the amount of permitted Blue Box support. Conversely, if a 
country has a lot of “unused credits” in the other components, these will then be applied 
to the Blue Box residual. It follows from this that the actual maximum permitted Blue 
Box payments can be less than the capped value.  
 
In order to calculate the maximum Blue Box payment entitlement, the following 
methodology is applied: 
1.  If a reduction in the Total AMS or either of the de minimis components yields an 
entitlement that is less than that actually applying in the base period, the reduction 
is assumed to be binding. 
2.  If a reduction in the Total AMS or either of the de minimis components results in 
an entitlement that is greater than that actually applying in the base period, the 
unused amount of support (difference between the maximum allowed and that 
actually applying in the base period) is assumed to be potentially transferable to 
the Blue Box entitlement. 
3.  The components under 1 and 2 are summed and then subtracted from the OTDS 
entitlement. The smaller of that figure or 5% of the value of production is 
assumed to define the actual Blue Box entitlement. This is denoted by “Actual 
Maximum Blue Box” in the table. 
 
It should be noted that this methodology may generate an underestimate of permitted 
Blue Box payments. This is because the reduction in the product specific de minimis can 
cause some support that was previously under that category to move into the AMS (if the 
AMS for those products is above the relevant production percentage). This would have 
the effect of generating some additional Blue Box credits. The only country actually 
affected by this in Table 5 is the United States, since its Blue Box entitlement is less than 
the capped value. 
 
From Table 5 it may be observed that the separate reduction formulas for overall 
domestic support and its components have differential effects across countries. For   32
example, only three of the countries (the EU, Norway and the United States) would face a 
binding reduction in the OTDS. These three countries plus Korea would face a binding 
reduction in the Total AMS. Only two countries (Canada and the United States) would 
face a binding reduction in the non product specific de minimis. The figures in the table 
suggest that no country would face a binding reduction in the product specific de 
minimis, but as noted above that is not necessarily accurate since some commodities may 
move from that category to the Total AMS as result of the reduction in the allowable 
production percentage. Two countries (the EU and Norway) would be required to make 
reductions in their Blue Box payments.  
 
With respect to the Blue Box it should also be noted that only one country (the United 
States) would face a payment maximum that is less than the 5 percent production value 
cap. The Blue Box cap would give a maximum level of payments of roughly $9.5 billion. 
However, the binding reduction in the OTDS for the United States implies that it would 
reduce the maximum permissible payments to around $6.6 billion. As noted in the 
Framework, countries would have the option of reducing other elements of the OTDS 
below the required bindings in order to protect their Blue Box entitlement. It is unclear 
whether the United States would choose to reduce the other components of support by the 
roughly $3 billion that would be needed to do this.  
 
For an OTDS entitlement reduction to be potentially binding on the non Blue Box 
components, its reduction percentage must exceed those applied to the components. If 
that is not the case, the OTDS entitlement reduction merely has the potential to determine 
the reduction in the Blue Box component. The sequencing of reductions in the OTDS 
entitlement (e.g., the suggested 20 percent reduction in the first year in the Framework) 
could accelerate reductions in the actual TAMS and de minimis in some countries, but the 
final reduction percentage in the OTDS entitlement is likely to have no additional impact 
on them. 
  
The second two blocks of figures in Table 5 present a tiered approach to the reduction in 
the OTDS entitlement and the bound TAMS. In this scenario, the reduction percentage of 
60 percent for both components is maintained for the European Union, Japan and the 
United States. A reduction percentage of 50 percent is applied for Canada and Norway, 
and Korea has a 40 percent reduction.  
 
The lower reduction percentages for Canada, Korea and Norway, compared to the earlier 
scenario, provide some additional flexibility. Korea, for example, reduces its actual AMS 
by around 700 billion Won (44 percent), compared to roughly 1 trillion Won (62 percent) 
under the earlier scenario. 
 
The percentage OTDS entitlements relative to the value of production indicate that the 
tiered approach leads to limited harmonization in relative support entitlements across the 
countries considered. Entitlements vary from a low of 10 percent in the United States to 
60 percent in Norway.  For the three major countries (EU, Japan and the United States) 
the ratio varies from 10 to 24 percent.  
   33
A major point to note is that the reductions in support entitlements have very different 
impacts across the countries. This is illustrated graphically in Figure 8 which shows the 
percentage reduction from the actual OTDS in the baseline that is required in each 
country to meet the OTDS entitlement ceiling under the tiered approach. It may be seen 
that since Canada, Japan and Korea are all below their entitlement ceiling, they would not 
be required to make any reduction in actual support (that provided in the base period). 
Norway, the European Union and the United States were all above their entitlement 
ceilings in the base period and would be required to make such reductions. The largest 
(over 40 percent) applies in Norway.  
 
A second point to note is that even with the magnitude of reductions assumed, Norway’s 
Blue Box payments in the base period would still be substantially above the entitlement 
of 5 percent of the value of production (actually in excess of 20 percent). The EU’s Blue 
Box entitlement would be roughly 29 percent of the base period value of those payments 
– which should be more than sufficient to accommodate recent changes in EU policy.
29 
The U.S. entitlement of $6.6 billion would be sufficient to accommodate CCPs in recent 
years, but might not be so if prices in the United States declined significantly.
30 
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Note: data relate to 1998-00 for Canada and Korea, 1999-01 for the EU, Norway and the United States, and 
2000-02 for Japan. 
 
                                                 
29 These changes mean that a large proportion (in excess of 75 percent) of former Blue Box payments will 
move to the Green Box. This assumes that the Green Box compatibility of the new Single Farm Payment 
scheme in the Union is not challenged or alternatively that the rules for the receipt of payments are changed 
to conform to the results of the ruling in the Cotton Case (see the discussion of the Green Box below). 
30 CCC net outlays on CCPs were $1.7 billion in Fiscal year (FY) 2002 (October 2001 – September 2002) 
and $0.8 billion in FY 2003. Budget estimates for FY2005 assume expenditures of $6.0 billion.    34
Figure 9 sheds some additional light on the implications of a tiered approach. This shows 
the percentage reduction in the base period OTDS entitlement that is required before 
actual reductions in the base period OTDS are necessary. In other words, it shows when 
those reductions would actually become binding on the provision of support to 
agriculture. The graph illustrates clearly the policy flexibility that countries like Japan, 
Canada and Korea appear to have in comparison to a country like Norway. A reduction of 
roughly 13 percent in the bound OTDS would become binding in that country, whereas a 
reduction of more than 80 percent would be required in Japan. As has been the case under 
the Uruguay Round Agreement, the initial starting conditions (i.e., the level of allowable 
support) that apply to each individual country are crucial in determining whether an 
agreement is likely to have any effect on the levels of support actually provided to 
agriculture. 
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Note: data relate to 1998-00 for Canada and Korea, 1999-01 for the EU, Norway and the United States, and 
2000-02 for Japan. 
 
The effects of the reductions assumed in Table 5 might be overstated since they are based 
on historical data. The future evolution of domestic support policies could affect the 
actual adjustments that would be necessary as a result of a new WTO agreement. To 
evaluate this would require assumptions about the future impact of changes in policies on 
the variables in Table 5. This paper does not attempt to derive such projections. However, 
an analysis of this type has been performed by Brink (2005). He assesses the impact of a 
reductions in the OTDS entitlement across four country tiers – Tier 1 (EU) 90 percent; 
Tier 2 (Japan and the United States) 80 percent; Tier 3 (Canada as an example) 70   35
percent; Tier 4 (Brazil as an example
31) 60 percent. Brink indicates that cuts of this 
magnitude would constrain the future ability of the European Union and the United States 
to increase trade-distorting support, but would not require major changes in existing 
policies.
32 He estimates that the European Union and the United States could make 
reductions of 76 percent in their OTDS entitlement without having to change their 
policies significantly in the future. The projections take into account the changes in the 
EU agricultural programs under the Mid-term review, in particular the shift from Blue 
Box to Green Box payments, and the continuation of the current U.S. Farm Act beyond 
2007 (with CCPs being included in the Blue Box). Using market price projections 
developed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Brink concludes that the European 
Union and the United States could absorb 72 percent and 61 percent cuts, respectively, in 
their total AMS commitment without a significant change in policies. Brink’s results 
support the conclusion reached through an analysis of recent historical data in this paper, 
that aggressive reduction percentages in the bound TAMS and the OTDS entitlement 
would be required in order to generate the need for significant changes in support policies 
in these countries. 
 
Conclusions about the impact of reduction formulas on policies need to be qualified in 
the light of inherent weaknesses in the measurement of the AMS. These may provide 
countries a means of avoiding the apparent discipline of an aggressive reduction in 
allowable support. The problem is illustrated by the case of rice in Japan. Figure 10 
shows the notified AMS for rice and the corresponding market price support (MPS) 
calculation from the OECD PSE/CSE database. 
 
The reported AMS for rice was reduced to zero from 1998 onwards. This was because 
Japan changed its rice policy in that year, announcing that future purchases of rice would 
only be made for the purposes of maintaining food security stocks, rather than to support 
market prices (Fukuda et al. 2003). As a result of this change, Japan has not included an 
AMS for rice in any of its subsequent notifications to the WTO. OECD data for market 
price support, as calculated in the Producer Support Estimate (Figure 10), suggest that e 
support (measured on the basis of the difference between domestic and world prices) for 
rice declined over the relevant period (1995-2002), but remained significant.  
 
This illustrates that countries may be able to stay within the current rules for calculating 
the AMS but manage to avoid effective reductions in support. In the specific case of 
Japan significant reductions in rice tariffs could offset the effects of the redefinition of 
domestic policy, by causing reductions in internal market prices. The same approach 
could be used for protected commodities in many other countries. However, if there is a 
desire to ensure that negotiated AMS reductions are potentially binding, there may need 
                                                 
31 He notes that China, which has no AMS commitment would maintain a very large OTDS entitlement if 
this method were to be applied – 2.5 times larger than that for the US and almost twice as large as that for 
the EU by the end of the reduction period. 
32 The US could face problems in low-price years through expanded loan deficiency payments and counter-
cyclical payments. This could require discretionary adjustments in loan rates and payment rates by the 
Secretary of Agriculture. Note also that Brink’s analysis is for the EU15; there may be potential 
implications for future payments resulting from the recent enlargement of the Union, or from potential 
future enlargement.   36
to be a change in the agreed methodology, for example, requiring countries to calculate 
the AMS using either an administered support price or an internal reference market price. 
 























Data from WTO notifications and the OECD PSE/CSE database 2004. 
 
TREATMENT OF THE GREEN BOX 
The AoA exempted certain types of payments from reduction if they meet “the 
fundamental requirement that they have no, or at most minimal trade-distorting effects or 
effects on production.” Policy specific criteria and conditions are specified in Annex 2 of 
the AoA. As may be noted from Table 2 and Figure 3, Green Box payments are of 
considerable significance for a number of countries. The Framework indicates that a 
review and clarification of criteria will be conducted to ensure no, or at most minimal, 
trade-distorting effects or effects on production and to provide for improved monitoring 
and surveillance of Green Box payments. The Harbinson Modalities suggested 
amendments to Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, clarifying the characteristics 
of payments with respect to income insurance and safety-net programs; disaster 
payments; structural adjustment assistance; and payments under environmental programs 
(with these to be extended to include animal welfare payments). There are clearly 
concerns among some countries that payments that are currently declared by countries as 
falling under the Green Box heading may be less than minimally distorting with respect 
to production and trade. 
 
The future of Green Box payments is currently uncertain because of the recent ruling 
under the Cotton Case in the WTO. In that case, Brazil brought a complaint against 
certain aspects of the cotton policies of the United States. A key aspect of the complaint,   37
for the purposes of the current discussion, was the panel’s finding that U.S. direct 
payments and the legislative and regulatory provisions which establish and maintain the 
direct payments program do not fully conform to the conditions set out in Annex 2 of the 
AoA. Following an appeal by the United States, the Appellate Body upheld the original 
panel decision. 
 
A key issue in the decision was whether the payments provided by the United States 
actually have an impact on production. Annex 2 of the AoA states that the amount of 
decoupled income support payments in a given year shall not be related to, or be based 
on, the type or volume of production undertaken in any year after the base year used in 
establishing the payments. The panel concluded that since the payments were conditional 
on producers not planting certain commodities (specifically fruits and vegetables) on the 
land upon which payments were based, and that producers were subject to penalties if 
they chose to do so, there was indeed a link to production decisions after the base period. 
This is an important decision not only for the United States, but also for the European 
Union, whose single farm payment (SFP), which is currently being introduced as a result 
of the Mid-term review in 2003, involves a similar requirement. One might conclude that 
a simple solution to this problem would simply be to relax the restriction on the ability of 
producers to devote their land to other crops, and that may indeed be the case. However, 
the decision appears to open up a broader set of issues. 
 
In both the European Union and the United States there appears to be a desire to link the 
provision of income support for agriculture to specific uses of agricultural land. The 
conditions for the SFP, for example, involve a definition of arable land that involves land 
cultivated for crop production, under set-aside or maintained in good agricultural and 
environmental condition. Although the implication of these particular conditions was not 
considered in the Cotton Case, such requirements might be interpreted as linking the 
provision of payments to agricultural activity (i.e., to production). To the extent that it 
could be demonstrated that such a requirement increases agricultural output directly or 
indirectly (the emphasis in the Green Box is on marketable agricultural output), the 
requirement might be challenged on the basis that it does not satisfy the condition of 
being minimally production and trade distorting. The broader implications of the Cotton 
Case for the provision of income support to agriculture remain to be determined, but may 
put into question support that is linked in any way to the continuance of agricultural 
activities that lead (directly or indirectly) to additional marketable output by the 
recipients of such support.  
 
A separate element of the Green Box that appears to recognize the legitimacy of such a 
linkage relates to the provision of payments under environmental programs. Annex 2 
acknowledges that producers may be required to meet certain conditions relating to 
production methods or inputs as part of such a program, but specifies that the amount of 
any payment made must be limited to the extra costs or loss of income involved in 
complying with the conditions of the program. The underlying assumption appears to be 
that governments may provide payments in order to secure the supply of environmental 
benefits associated with agriculture’s use of the land, but it is unclear whether some of 
the environmental programs that are being developed would conform to the Green Box   38
conditions. The thrust of those conditions appears to be on programs that compensate 
producers for the private costs of complying with environmental regulations or conditions 
set by the government, they do not appear to condone an approach that would reward 
producers for the social value of those services, i.e., on the basis of what the general 
public would be prepared to pay for the provision of such services if there were actually a 
market for them.  
 
The underlying assumption behind the concept of multifunctionality (agriculture as a 
source of both commodities and non-commodity outputs), seems to be that the optimal 
supply of agriculture’s non-commodity outputs, such as landscape, wildlife habitat, 
biodiversity, and cultural heritage can only be guaranteed by providing farmers a 
sufficient economic incentive to provide those attributes. That incentive may need to 
cover the opportunity costs faced by farmers (their potential earnings in non-agricultural 
activities or use of the land for alternative purposes), rather than simply covering the 
additional costs that environmental programs may impose due to their impact on specific 
agricultural or land-use practices. Blandford and Boisvert (2005a) argue that payments 
for such services that are established through competitive bids, as in the Conservation 
Reserve Program of the United States, may satisfy the income foregone condition of the 
AoA, since it can be argued that farmers’ individual bids will be related to the 
opportunity costs of the use of their land, i.e., to income foregone. However, it is by no 
means clear that incentive payments that are set by governments for producers to 
participate in environmental schemes or the provision of direct income payments that 
have environmental conditions attached to them would conform to current Green Box 
rules. 
  
A more general and difficult issue with the Green Box, as currently defined, is that some 
categories of payments may, of necessity, have an impact on production. This is 
particularly true for environmental payments and proposed animal welfare payments. 
These are often designed to help support a particular production process or level of output 
in order to generate positive externalities or public goods. While considerable confusion 
exists in the policy debate on these issues, there is little doubt that the correction of 
market failures associated with agriculture (where they exist) will affect land use and 
production, either positively or negatively (Blandford and Boisvert 2005b). The concern 
is that such payments will become a new mechanism for supporting otherwise 
agriculturally uncompetitive activities under an environment of freer trade. The domestic 
redistributive effects of Green Box payments may be an issue for the countries involved 
(e.g., because of the efficiency implications of deadweight taxation losses and equity 
concerns), and such payments may generate “subsidy envy” among countries that are not 
able to afford them, if such payments can indeed be made minimally distorting one might 
question whether it would be worth the effort to try to cap them in a new agreement. 
 
What is clear is that the current Green Box includes many different types of payments, 
some of which are likely to be more distorting than others. One might argue that there 
should be an attempt to move some of these payments that a priori are likely to have the 
greatest impact on production (in particular, those relating to direct income supports, 
income insurance and income safety-net programs, and crop insurance) into a more   39
conditional Box that will be subject to reduction – perhaps into the Blue Box.
33 As noted 
earlier, in connection with the discussion of other Blue Box measures, so-called 
decoupled payments may indeed have an impact on production that cannot be justified on 
the grounds of correcting for market failure. 
 
Even with a clearer elaboration of the characteristics of Green Box payments, the ability 
to impose greater discipline on the types of payments provided will be problematical. 
One problem is that the AoA refers to payments not programs – there is considerable 
flexibility to change payment names and forms (e.g., the changes in U.S. payments 
between the 1996 and 2002 Farm Acts) while keeping the fundamental instruments the 
same.  
 
A final issue is how to improve monitoring and surveillance, as called for in the 
Framework. One option would be to have a formal WTO review process for new 
payments with a panel to review their conformity with the minimally distorting 
requirement. In such a process the responsibility would rest on the country proposing to 
create a new program to demonstrate that it is minimally distorting (Blandford 2001). If it 
were judged not to be so, the support under such a program would be included in the 
Amber Box and counted against the OTDS commitment. 
 
SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT (S&D) 
The Framework Agreement calls for special and differential treatment (S&D) for 
developing countries to include longer implementation periods and lower reduction 
coefficients for all types of trade-distorting domestic support and for continued access to 
the provisions under Article 6.2 (the exemption for direct or indirect assistance for 
agriculture and rural development). Least Developed Countries will not be required to 
make any reduction commitments. 
 
The Harbinson Modalities included draft amendments to Article 6.2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, clarifying the forms of assistance to encourage agricultural and rural 
development in developing countries that would be exempt from domestic support 
reduction commitments. It also proposed a 10 year implementation period for 
commitments, compared to a 5 year period for developed countries. 
  
The Framework specifies that the negotiated reductions in de minimis should take into 
account S&D; with an exemption for developing countries that allocate almost all de 
minimis support to subsistence and resource-poor farmers. It is not clear exactly how (if 
at all) that will be determined as part of a final agreement. The Harbinson Modalities 
proposed that the 10 percent de minimis for developing countries be maintained, with 
credit for negative product-specific support up to a maximum of 10 percent of the value 
of production for that commodity. 
 
As indicated in the earlier analysis for Korea, the approach to reductions in support 
proposed under the Framework may not have much impact on the ability of developing 
                                                 
33 This is the suggestion made for direct income payments by de Gorter et al. (2003).   40
countries to support agriculture, even if they have a bound TAMS. Countries that have no 
such commitments will find themselves in a truly preferential position. This point is made 
by Brink (2005) with respect to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). He argues that 
even without a TAMS binding, the PRC will have substantial flexibility should it decide 
to provide support to its agricultural sector in the future. The 15 percent value of 
production in China’s OTDS entitlement will provide considerable room for maneuver. 
 
The substantial and rapid economic growth of China and that of a number of other 
developing countries raises the question as to whether such countries should be granted 
the same special and differential treatment as poorer developing countries. In particular, 
there will be an issue as to whether all developing countries who are required to reduce 
non-exempt support will be placed in the same (lowest) tier for reductions and subject to 
the lowest reduction percentage. Brink (2005) assumed a common lower tier of 40 
percent for reductions in the ODTS entitlement and bound TAMS by developing 
countries. Whether all developing countries should be treated equally is an important 
issue in other areas, particularly market access, or whether different groups of developing 
countries (differentiated on the basis of per capita income, for example), should be 
treated differently in a final agreement. In particular, if much of the future potential 
growth in agricultural imports is likely to be in the middle income developing countries, 
it may not be desirable to exempt such countries from a significant expansion of market 
access for agricultural products. This is a central issue in the current negotiations.  
 
OTHER ISSUES  
There are some other issues relating to the treatment of domestic support that are relevant 
to other components of a final agreement. Presumably the choice of the base period or 
periods used in capping or determining reductions in domestic support will not be 
independent of base periods in the parts of a final agreement relating to market access 
and export competition. As has been noted above, variations in the base period may have 
differing implications for key countries in the negotiations. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the implementation periods for reductions in domestic 
support are likely to be linked to other elements of the agreement. It has already been 
established that there will be a shorter implementation period for concessions by 
developed country members of the WTO and a longer period for the developing country 
members. The Harbinson Modalities foresaw an implementation period of 5 years for the 
former and 10 years for the latter. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The introduction of the concept of Overall Trade Distorting Support in the current WTO 
negotiations appears to be a positive development for those who would like to see a 
reduction in distortions in international agricultural trade created by domestic agricultural 
policies. The OTDS will bring forms of support that were previously exempt from 
reduction commitments, specifically de minimis and Blue Box support, under WTO 
disciplines. Questions still remain over the workability of product specific caps on the   41
AMS, the method used to calculate the AMS, and the future of the Green Box – at the 
very least there will need to be a significant improvement in the monitoring and 
surveillance of payments made under that category of support. Questions also remain 
over the treatment of support in developing countries and, in particular, the way in which 
special and differential treatment will be handled. 
 
The implications of a formula approach to the reduction of permitted support are 
complex. As has been illustrated, the final effects of a reduction formula will depend on 
the initial permitted levels of support and how these relate to the actual support provided, 
as well as on the percentages applied. One of the major conclusions from an analysis of 
data from recent country notifications is that aggressive reduction percentages of at least 
60 percent will be required in the OTDS entitlement and bound TAMS if an agreement is 
to translate into future reductions in the actual level of domestic support provided to 
agriculture in many countries. In the absence of such an approach, such countries will be 
able to conduct their agricultural policies on a “business as usual” basis. It that happens 
critics of the Doha round of negotiations may well come to a similar conclusion as the 
critics of the Uruguay round – much progress on paper, but relatively little in practice.   42
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